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INTRODUCTION
Psychiatry faces major challenges: its nosology is agnostic about mechanisms, lacks predictive validity, and leads to trial-and-error treatment (1, 2) . Strikingly, neuroscientific advances have hardly affected nosology or clinical practice (3) . One response to this disconnect is computational psychiatry, with its emerging focus on clinical applications (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) .
One strategy for computational psychiatry is to learn from internal medicine where mechanistic frameworks for differential diagnosis enable targeted treatment decisions for individual patients. Importantly, differential diagnosis does not necessarily require molecular mechanisms. Much coarser distinctions -such as inflammatory, infectious, vascular, neoplastic, autoimmunological, or hereditary causes of disease -can provide crucial guidance for treatment as they disclose fundamentally distinct disease processes. This paper outlines a framework for differential diagnosis that is motivated by a general computational perspective on brain function. While not the first attempt of its kind (4, (12) (13) (14) , this paper makes three contributions. First, we adopt a diseaseindependent motif -the inference-control loop as fundament of cybernetic theories (15) (16) (17) (18) -and consider how this may help systematizing computational perspectives on brain-world and brain-body interactions. Second, we consider a hierarchical Bayesian implementation that suggests three possible computational quantities (predictions, prediction errors, and their precisions) at five potential failure loci (sensation, perception, metacognition, forecasting, action). Third, we discuss the potential clinical utility of this taxonomy for differential diagnosis in computational psychiatry and psychosomatics; cf. (14, (19) (20) (21) .
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Petzschner et al. 5 renders perception an interpretation of sensations, guided by prior beliefs and a model of the world (28, 29) . Among many findings supporting this notion, illusions prominently illustrate how learned physical regularities can shape perception profoundly (30, 31) ; Figure 2A . When sensations are ambiguous, perception can expand the capacity for control, particularly when action selection requires information about hierarchically deep states of the world that relate nonlinearly to sensations. For example, in social interactions, inferring the nature of others' acts that generated visual input may not be sufficient; instead, inference on deeper states, such as the intentions of others' that generated their acts may be required (32, 33) .
A second challenge is that inference on current states of the world can only finesse reactive control. By contrast, prospective control requires predicting the world's future states (forecasting), taking into account both the influence of possible actions (34, 35) and the world's endogenous dynamics (36) ( Figure 1C ).
Third, action selection and execution is influenced by beliefs about one's abilities (37) . This self-monitoring of one's level of mastery in acting upon the world is part of metacognition and can be seen as a high-level form of inference about one's capacity for control (19, 38) ( Figure 1C ).
Finally, given an inferred (or forecast) state of the world, actions can be selected to achieve a particular goal (optimize some objective function). This objective function can defined differently -for example, in terms of utility (39) , reward (34) , cost (40) , loss (41) , or surprise (42) . Figure 1C depicts a schematic illustration of the extended inference-control loop.
Importantly, any given action alters the world, thus shaping future sensory input. In M A N U S C R I P T
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Petzschner et al. 6 other words, sensation, perception, forecasting and actions form a closed loop between the brain and its external world. For brevity, we refer to this entire cycle as inference-control loop. Its closed-loop nature is fundamentally important as it creates problems of circular causality that are at the core of diagnostic challenges we examine below.
COMPUTATIONAL MODELING OF INFERENCE-CONTROL LOOPS
We now consider how inference-control loops can be formalized as concrete computational models. Here, we adopt hierarchical Bayesian models (HBMs) but emphasize that this is not the only possible perspective; for forecasting and control in particular, alternative (and arguably more established) modeling approaches exist, e.g. (34, (43) (44) (45) . We prefer a hierarchical Bayesian view for two main reasons. First, it uses the same formalism and quantities -precision-weighted predictions and prediction errors -for implementing perception, forecasting, reactive/prospective control and metacognition alike. This suggests a compact taxonomy of computational dysfunctions and their differential diagnosis; cf. (2, 14) . Second, the formulation of control in HBMs is intimately connected to concepts of homeostatic (reactive) and allostatic (prospective) control, which are of central importance for psychosomatics.
Bayesian Inference
A widely adopted concept of perception is the Bayesian framework (27, 28, 46, 47) .
This casts perception as inference, where prior beliefs about hidden states of the M A N U S C R I P T
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world are updated in the light of sensory data to yield a posterior belief ( Figure 3A ) (24, 27) . A popular notion is that this computation rests on a (hierarchical)
"generative model" of how sensory data are caused by hidden states of the world (28, 29, 48, 49 ); see Figure 3A . Inverting this model under beliefs about the states' a priori probability allows for inferring the causes of sensations.
Bayesian models explain phenomena across the spectrum of perception, for example, how humans combine multi-sensory information (50, 51) and how biases and illusions result from prior beliefs and experience (24, 30, 52, 53) .
A key point for this paper is that Bayesian belief updates have, for most probability distributions, a generic form: the change in belief is proportional to prediction error (PE) -the difference between actual (sensory) data and predicted data (under the prior) -weighted by a precision ratio (54). The latter is critical, as it determines the relative influence of prior and sensory data: precise predictions (priors reduce, while precise sensory inputs increase belief updates ( Figure 3A) . Generally, abnormal computations and/or signaling of any of these three quantities -PEs, predictions, precisions -could disrupt inference.
Hierarchical Bayesian Models
The hierarchical structure of the external world suggests an equivalent (mirrored) structure of the brain's generative model (28, 48) . Anatomically, this "hierarchical Bayesian" idea is supported by structural hierarchies in cortex (55-57). Popular hierarchical Bayesian models (HBMs) include hierarchical filtering (HF; (54, 58)) and predictive coding (PC; (28, 49) ). In these models, each level holds a belief M A N U S C R I P T
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(prediction) about the state of the level below (PC) or its rate of change (HF). This prediction is signaled to the lower level where it is compared against the actual state, resulting in a PE. This PE is sent back up the hierarchy to update the predictionand thus reduce future PEs. Critically, again, this update is weighted by a precision ratio ( Figure 3A ): higher precision of bottom-up signals (sensory inputs or PEs) or lower precision of predictions lead to more pronounced belief updates.
Neurobiologically, in cortex, predictions are likely signaled via NMDA receptors (NMDARs) at descending connections, PEs via AMPA receptors (and possibly NMDARs) at ascending connections, while precision-weighting depends on postsynaptic gain; this is determined by neuromodulators (e.g., dopamine, acetylcholine; (59)) and GABAergic inhibition (for reviews, (60) (61) (62) (63) (64) ).
In an HBM context, the brain's objective function can be seen as minimizing PEs (as a proxy to surprise) under its generative model (65) . Notably, PEs can not only be reduced by updating the generative model (as above), but also by changing the precision of sensory channels (attention), or by actions that fulfil predictions. The latter is "active inference" (35, 42, 66) ), a concept in line with the cybernetic notion that "... control systems control what they sense, not what they do." (17) M A N U S C R I P T
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While different formalisms of forecasting exist (34, 43, 44, 69) , their common theme is a "forward simulation" under a given model. Bayesian implementations of forecasting include "planning by inference" (36, 70) and inference on trajectories of states (generalized coordinates; (42, 71) ). One challenge for psychiatric/psychosomatic applications is that the model often not only needs to predict the effects of chosen actions, but also the intrinsic dynamics of environment and body (36, 45) .
Turning to action, HBMs can implement both reactive and prospective control. The former occurs through a reflex arc at the bottom of the hierarchy ( Figure 3B ).
Specifically, replacing classical cybernetic setpoints with beliefs about hidden states that cause sensory inputs, reactive control can be cast as a reflex where PEs elicit corrective actions that minimize surprise about sensory inputs (19, 42) . Importantly, the belief's precision determines the vigor of these actions (19) ; a property that allows for new explanations of psychosomatic phenomena and placebo effects (see below). Prospective control can be implemented by dynamically adjusting this belief (e.g., its mean or precision) as a function of predicted future states (19, 72) . These predictions could be signaled from higher levels in the HBM that implement forecasting.
Action selection in HBMs could, in principle, proceed with respect to optimizing any chosen objective function, e.g., a subject-specific utility function (73) . We focus on active inference (35, 42, 66) as a specific proposal. Simply speaking, this postulates that actions serve to minimize PEs by changing the world (environment or body) in order to fulfil the brain's expectation of sensory inputs. We focus on this idea because it is closely related to cybernetics (e.g., perceptual control theory; (17) ) and
represents a probabilistic formulation of the core principle of homeostasis -that regulatory actions minimize discrepancies between expected and actual inputs. It thus provides a basis for formal models of brain-body interactions (19) and a bridge to psychosomatics.
Finally, metacognition could be incorporated into HBMs through an additional layer that holds expectations about the level of PEs throughout an inference hierarchy (19) ; Figure 1 . This layer infers the performance of the inference-control loop as a whole, enabling a representation (and updating) of mastery or self-efficacy beliefs.
INTEROCEPTION AND HOMEOSTATIC/ALLOSTATIC CONTROL
HBMs have been used for more than two decades to investigate perceptual inference on environmental states (exteroception) (48, 49, 54, 74, 75) . However, the same inference challenge exists with regard to bodily states (interoception; (76) (77) (78) ).
Signals from bodily sensors (interosensations) -such as blood oxygenation and osmolality, temperature, pain, heartrate, or plasma concentrations of metabolites and hormones -reach the brain through various afferent pathways that converge on posterior/mid insula cortex (79-81), a region regarded as interoceptive cortex (82, 83) . Several lines of evidence -in particular from pain and placebo research (for reviews, (79, (84) (85) (86) ) -indicate that interosensations are not processed "raw" but shaped by prior beliefs ( Figure 2B ).
Supported by anatomical and physiological findings (for review, (77, 87) ), it has been
proposed that perception and control of bodily states follow the same hierarchical Bayesian principles as for environmental states (76) (77) (78) . This implies that a joint Neuroanatomically concrete circuits for interoception and homeostatic/allostatic control have been suggested (19, 78, 80, 81, 87) . Anterior insula (AI) and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) play a central role in these proposals as they are thought to represent current and predicted states of the body within the external world (80, 90, 91) . Equipped with projections to regions with homeostatic reflex arcs (e.g., hypothalamus, brainstem), AI and ACC may signal the forecasts that guide allostatic control (19, 80, 87) . Furthermore, they likely interface interoceptive and exteroceptive systems and mediate their interactions, such as the influence of interoceptive signals on exteroceptive judgments (92) (93) (94) (Figure 4) .
A TAXONOMY OF FAILURE LOCI AND COMPUTATIONAL DYSFUNCTIONS
Our general thesis is that conceptualizing adaptive behavior in terms of inferencecontrol loops and their concrete implementation as hierarchical Bayesian models systematizes potential failure loci and associated computational dysfunctions. The ensuing taxonomy of disease mechanisms could guide differential diagnosis, in analogous ways for computational psychiatry and computational psychosomatics.
That is, in the general inference-control loop outlined above, maladaptive behavior could arise from primary disruptions at five major loci ( Figure 3B ):
Clearly, each of these processes could be conceptualized under different computational frameworks. In the specific case of HBMs, failures at any of these levels can arise from disturbances in a small set of computational quantities ( Figure   3A ):
(ii) top-down signals (expectations or predictions), (iii) their precision (inverse uncertainty).
These two axes may lend useful overarching structure to pathogenetic considerations and provide a conceptual grid for classifying disease mechanisms in M A N U S C R I P T
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computational psychiatry and computational psychosomatics. However, this requires that the above levels and quantities can be inferred non-invasively in individual patients, using computational assays that can be applied to behavioral, (neuro)physiological and neuroimaging data (6, 95) . Suitable techniques for modelbased inference on pwPE signaling in cortical hierarchies exist (96); due to space limitations, we discuss them in the Supplementary Material.
Computational Psychosomatics
Psychosomatic medicine is concerned with somatic diseases that are caused or influenced by mental processes (97), for example, bodily symptoms caused by beliefs. Classic examples for the influence of beliefs on bodily states are placebo/nocebo effects (84-86) ( Figure 2B ). Here, expectations about the effects of an intervention trigger reactions that fulfil the expectation. Importantly, the strength of placebo is known to depend not only on beliefs about effect amplitude, but also on the precision of this belief (85) . Our framework offers a formal explanation for this empirical phenomenon because in HBM implementations of homeostatic control the vigor of belief-fulfilling actions depend on the precision of these beliefs (19) .
Computational treatments of psychosomatic disorders are rare (but see (98, 99) ).
This may be due to the (perceived) lack of a comprehensive framework that formalizes interoception and homeostatic/allostatic control and makes them measurable in the individual patient. In the following, we consider one concrete problem of differential diagnosis and describe how the conceptual grid described above may guide the search for the locus of the primary (initial) abnormality.
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Example: Depression and somatic symptoms
Depression includes many patients with somatic abnormalities, including cardiac (100), immunological (101), and metabolic disturbances (102) . One long-standing explanation of this association highlights maladaptive beliefs. For example, false high-level beliefs about volatility of the world could cause prolonged allostatic responses, with persistent sympathetic activation and ensuing damage to cardiovascular, immunological and metabolic health ("allostatic load"; (89, 103) ). In our framework, the influence of high-level beliefs could be mediated via projections from allostatic control regions (e.g., AI, ACC) on sympathetic effector regions (e.g., hypothalamus, amygdala or PAG) where they elicit autonomic actions by altering homeostatic setpoints. Notably, HBMs can infer fluctuations in beliefs about environmental volatility from behavioral and peripheral physiological measurements (32, 58, 75, 98) . These belief trajectories could be integrated into physiological models (e.g., dynamic causal models; (96, 104)) of the above connection strengths and, by comparing models with/without modulatory effects of these beliefs, identify patients in whom bodily symptoms are possible consequences of beliefs. One might also hypothesize that these connection strengths correlate with peripheral indices of sympathetic activation (105) .
An opposite interpretation views depression as "reactive" to initial somatic disease.
In our framework this can be formalized as a metacognitive response to (real or perceived) chronic dyshomeostasis. One implementation of metacognition in HBMs is through a top-level layer which holds beliefs about the performance of the inference-control loop. In this "allostatic self-efficacy" (19) concept, persistently
elevated PEs decrease one's beliefs of mastery over bodily states; this metacognitive "diagnosis" of lack of control may lead to depression as a form of learned helplessness. This proposal could be tested by correlating model-based indices of interoceptive PE signaling with questionnaire measures of self-efficacy and helplessness.
Critically, our framework emphasizes that dyshomeostasis could be real or perceived, and could exist independently from the brain or be caused by it:
A real bodily source of dyshomeostasis (that evades cerebral attempts of regulation).
(ii) Sensations: altered bodily receptors ("broken sensor"); e.g. visceral hypersensitivity (106)). 
Computational Psychiatry
Bayesian perspectives of inference-control impairments feature frequently in computational concepts of depression (19, 87) , autism (20, (114) (115) (116) (117) , schizophrenia (12, 21, 60, 61, 118, 119) , and anxiety (58, 120, 121). Here, we briefly discuss one application of this framework to distinguish disease mechanisms in autism spectrum disorder (ASD). Figure 3A ). Typical symptoms, such as repetitive behaviors and avoidance of complex and volatile situations (e.g., social interactions), can then be interpreted as coping mechanisms to reduce PEs; see (20) for discussion.
Example: Autism Spectrum Disorder
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Additionally, ASD individuals show various interoceptive disturbances (122, 123 ) that may equally result from an increase in sensory precision from the viscera or a failure to attenuate it (7). Viscerosensory precision-weighting has been linked to oxytocin; associated disturbances during development might compromise the construction of generative models that attribute self vs. other agency to interoceptive experiences (7, 124) .
The competing explanations of high sensory vs. low belief precision (116) could be disambiguated by psychophysical experiments in combination with Bayesian models of perception. These have previously been used to assess individual sensory processing (50, 125, 126) in healthy volunteers; as have been EEG-based circuit models of precision-weighting in auditory cortex (127). These models could be used in ASD to detect (sub)groups with exaggerated precision estimates of sensory inputs and insufficiently precise predictions, respectively (20) .
CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES
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Assessing the computational anatomy of circuit dysfunctions follows principles of homeostatic thinking, as is commonplace in medicine, and holds great diagnostic potential. However, its clinical translation faces nontrivial challenges -particularly in application to psychosomatics.
Chicken and egg problems
The inference-control loop represents the conceptual heart of theories of homeostasis, allostasis, and cybernetics ( Figure 1 ). Its closed-loop nature means that a dysfunction in one domain typically invokes a cascade of changes throughout the circuit, making it difficult to differentiate cause from consequence. 
Universality versus specificity
The HBM framework suggests pwPEs as a central computational quantity for inference, forecasting, action and metacognition alike. This generalizing view has pros and cons. On the one hand, it suggests a conceptual grid for differential diagnosis and implies that computational differentiation of pwPE abnormalities could find broad diagnostic application. On the other hand, one may be concerned that we portray cortex as a "non-specific hierarchical Bayesian machine" (as put by one reviewer) without neuroanatomical specificity. We do not wish to convey this impression. The inference problems the brain faces vary, for example, depending on the sensory channels involved and the depth of hierarchical coupling among environmental states. Different tasks require different types of (cortically represented) generative models and thus distinct circuits; compare proposed circuits for interoception/allostasis (19, 87) and vision/oculomotor control (42, 72) ).
Empirically, in tasks using the same sensory modality but requiring inference on concrete vs. abstract social quantities, pwPEs were reflected by activity in partially overlapping and partially distinct circuits (75, 135) . ingredient can alter the perception of a physical condition (e.g. reduce physical pain) and elicit autonomic reactions (e.g. an immune response). Again, the change in perception depends on a prior belief -here, that the treatment will be effective.
Notably, the placebo effect scales with the predicted efficacy of the intervention (for example, syringes are typically considered more potent than pills). In psychophysical experiments, Bayesian models can distinguish different causes of perceptual abnormalities, e.g., by manipulating sensory and belief precisions (1) . Crucially, the dependence of belief updates on a precision ratio ( Figure 3 ) means that the same abnormality in belief updating could result from altered precision of bottom-up signals (sensory inputs or PEs), or from inversely altered precision of prior beliefs. This ambiguity is at the core of several pathophysiological debates (e.g., in autism; see main text).
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In behavioral experiments, belief updating can be induced by changing the individual experience (2, 3), frames and suggestions (4, 5) , or dynamically via cues (6) (7) (8) (9) . This may not only concern low-level sensory priors, but also abstract beliefs, including volatility (7, 10, 11), optimism (12), intentions of others (8) , and metacognitive beliefs (e.g., learned helplessness (13)). HBMs provide trajectories of PEs, precisions and predictions at multiple, hierarchically coupled levels and in individual subjects (14, 15) . Additionally, these computational trajectories can be used as regressors in fMRI analyses (7, 10) .
The application of generative models to behavioral data has so far been restricted to the exteroceptive domain, while interoception has relied more on questionnaires (16) and behavioral assessments such as heartbeat detection tasks (17), but also on neurophysiological studies. For example, the functional connectivity of interoceptive circuits has been studied in health (18) and depression (19, 20) . However, functional connectivity is descriptive and specifies undirected coupling estimates. In order to reveal more specific circuit mechanisms, such as the directionality of message passing in cortical hierarchies, generative models of fMRI and MEG/EEG data are required. Here, we focus on dynamic causal models (DCMs). These can not only estimate directed connection strengths, but can also assess putative biological mechanisms of precision-weighting and prediction/PE signaling.
While the neurobiology of precision-weighted PE signaling in cortex is not understood fully, a general picture is emerging. The evidence so far suggests that predictions are signaled via NMDA receptors (NMDARs) at descending connections (mainly originating from infragranular layers) whereas PEs are likely conveyed via AMPA (and possibly also NMDARs) at ascending connections (primarily originating from supragranular layers) (21) . Finally, precision-weighting depends on postsynaptic gain which is determined by neuromodulators (e.g., dopamine, acetylcholine; (22)) and local GABAergic inhibition (for reviews, see (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) ). It is worth noting that both NMDAR function and synthesis of neuromodulatory transmitters can be altered by bodily factors, such as peripherally produced pro-inflammatory cytokines, hormones, and metabolites (e.g., kynurenines); for reviews, see (28) and (29) . 
GLOSSARY
Active Inference
The active inference framework shares the core ideas of predictive coding but generalizes them to action selection. In particular, active inference postulates that belief updating in response to prediction errors is only one way of achieving a long-term goal of surprise minimization. Alternatively, the brain can reduce surprise or prediction error by eliciting actions that lead to sensory inputs that are in accordance with the brain's expectations. Predictions (prior expectations) about sensory inputs therefore define preferences or goals that engender behaviour; in other words, control is directed towards sensory input, not motor output. Importantly, the choice between reducing prediction error through changing predictions (updates of the generative model) or through action depends on precision.
Allostasis
Allostasis refers to the process of achieving stability (homeostasis) through (behavioral or physiological) change. Allostatic regulation occurs prior to a homeostatic perturbation and serves to avoid dyshomeostatic future states, guided by predictions of a model (forecasting). In contrast to the reactive (error-driven) control of classical homeostasis, allostasis reflects a prospective (anticipatory) form of control.
Bayes' rule
Bayes theorem allows one to compute a posterior belief, given some sensory input (likelihood, p(y|x,m)) and a prediction (prior, p(x|m)). The posterior is a "compromise" between likelihood and prior, weighted by their relative precisions, and represents the optimal integration of prior knowledge with new observations. The model evidence p(y|m) in the denominator of Bayes' theorem is a normalization constant that forms the basis for Bayesian model comparison.
Cybernetics
Cybernetics is a transdisciplinary approach that is concerned with the possible mechanisms of feedback-based regulation within a system. In the classical negative feedback loop of cybernetics, a sensor signal (reflecting the state M A N U S C R I P T 
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Forecasting
Forecasting means predicting the world's future states taking into account both the influence of possible actions and the world's endogenous dynamics, and can be used to inform action selection. In the context of allostasis, predictions concern the degree to which the action considered will keep bodily states close to a homeostatic set point over time.
Generative Model A generative model m specifies how sensory data y are generated from hidden states x by combining a likelihood function p(y|x, m) with a prior p(x|m). In the context of perception, this corresponds to a probabilistic mapping from hidden states in the world to the sensory inputs the agent receives (likelihood), together with an a-priori distribution of the world's possible states.
Hierarchical Bayesian Model Hierarchical Bayesian models are generative models of sensory inputs that reflect the hierarchical structure of processes in the physical and social environment. Each level of the hierarchy provides a prediction (prior) for the state of the level below; the mismatch (prediction error) between this prediction and the actual state (likelihood) is sent upwards and serves to update the prior. Importantly, under broad assumptions (i.e., for all distributions from the exponential family), hierarchical Bayesian belief updates have a generic form in that they are
proportional to the prediction error and the precision of the prior belief.
Homeostasis
Homeostasis refers to the property of a biological agent to actively regulate its bodily states (such as temperature or salt concentration) such that they stay within a healthy normal range with respect to pre-defined set points. The goal is the constancy of the internal environment (or milieu intérieur) in which the cells of the body live and survive. In classical homeostasis, regulatory actions ensue as a function of the mismatch between the actual bodily sate (as signaled by sensory input from the respective organ) and the expected state (i.e., the set point).
Inference In most cases, sensory organs provide only limited and noisy information about an agent's environment. Therefore, the true state of the world may be hidden from the observing agent.
By employing a generative model of how environmental states cause the sensory input, an agent may infer on the respective unknown states. Inference corresponds to the inversion of the generative model, that is, given the observed data (sensory inputs) and prior knowledge, the agent can compute the probability of the hidden states (the posterior) according to Bayes' rule.
Interoception
Interoception refers to the sense of the physiological condition of the body and can be understood as inference on internal (bodily) states, where interosensations (i.e., sensory signals originating from internal sensors like thermoreceptors or baroreceptors) are combined with prior knowledge (expectations) to form posterior beliefs about states of the body such as temperature or heart rate.
Likelihood, Prior, Posterior The likelihood function p(y|x,m) describes how any given state of the world x (e.g., a light switch) causes a sensory input y (e.g., light on the retina of the agent) with a certain probability. The prior p(x|m) expresses the range of values environmental states inhabit a priori (e.g., is it light or dark more often?) and thus encodes learned environmental statistics. likelihood and prior according to Bayes' rule and represents the inference on a hidden state (e.g., 'the light switch is on'), given prior knowledge and a new observation.
Meta-cognition Metacognition, or cognition about cognition (thinking about thinking), implies both knowledge about one's own cognition and control of one's own cognition. In the sense of self-monitoring or self-evaluation, it refers to a set of beliefs held by the brain about its own functional capacity.
Predictive Coding Predictive coding postulates that the brain infers the most likely causes (environmental states) underlying sensory input by inverting a hierarchical generative model which reflects the hierarchical structure of the environment. At any given level of the model, prediction errors (deviations of the actual input from the expected input) signal that the model needs to be updated and thus drive inference and learning. Inspired by the remarkably hierarchical structure of sensory processing streams in cortex, the idea is that backward connections signal predictions to the next lower level of the hierarchy, while forward connections transmit the prediction errors the higher level cortical regions to update the prediction. Predictive coding attempts to describe perception, but does not directly speak to action selection and control.
Psychosomatics
In psychosomatic disorders, mental processes such as beliefs and expectations are believed to play a significant role in the development, expression, or resolution of a physical illness. Psychosomatic medicine more generally explores the influence of social, psychological and behavioral factors on bodily processes.
Sensation
Sensory inputs (sensations) reach the brain through afferent pathways both from the external senses -vision, audition, touch, taste and smell -as well as internal sensors (baroreceptors, chemoreceptors, thermoreceptors, etc.). In frameworks like Predictive Coding, the actual sensations will, on any level of the cortical hierarchy, be compared against the expected sensory inputs (under some prior) to yield a M A N U S C R I P T
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Petzschner et al. Supplement   9 prediction error, which then serves as the (sensory) input to next higher level. The term "sensation" is not meant to imply a necessarily conscious event. Instead, any conscious experience is more likely to reflect the result of an inference process, i.e., the combination of a sensory input (a sensation) with a prior belief (an expectation) to form a posterior belief.
Surprise Surprise refers to the unlikeliness of (sensory) events (given a model), or, in other words, how far sensory events deviate from prior expectations. Mathematically, the (Shannon) surprise S of an event y is equal to the negative logarithm of the probability of that event, given the model m:
This information-theoretic concept of surprise is equivalent to the negative log model evidence; a good model is thus one that minimises surprise about the data. Practically, prediction error (PE), i.e., the difference between predicted and actual input, is often used as a proxy for surprise.
